Nuclear non-proliferation: Divergent views on the same goal

          I know this is post-class, but I wanted to deal with the two articles relating to nuclear non-proliferation, Bruce Blair’s Increasing Warning and Decision Time (‘De-Alerting’) and Hugh Gusterson’s Nuclear Weapons and the Other in the Western Imagination, which we didn’t get to discuss today. Both discuss the concept of nuclear proliferation/non-proliferation but do so from incredibly divergent points of view.
          Blair’s article is a pragmatic approach to how nuclear-armed powers, all nuclear-armed powers, could over time move to nuclear-free status. He acknowledges that the steps required would not be easy to achieve and that steps might take years if they ever came fruition. He also highlighted instances where luck more than technical controls prevented horrible nuclear accidents, was critical of the US’ reliance on technical means of detection, and highlighted the almost non-existent margins for error when determining if a nuclear state has launched an attack.  It is clear he sees nuclear weapons in a negative light and wants to see a world where they no longer play a role in security. He is also realistic in the extraordinary efforts that will be required to achieve this goal and to have given a great deal of consideration to ways to achieve this end.

          I contrast this article with Gusterson’s, which I took a strong dislike to. First, he is writing in a journal of cultural anthropology and not in a journal dedicated to nuclear issues, security issues, or international relations. While he writes in what I assume is the language of his field, I took what was written to be his personal views presented with the imprimatur of academic rigor. My complaints are numerous. First and overall, he is critical of nuclear non-proliferation efforts by the West at the time of the article, but advances no alternatives, coping out with the claim he is “broadly antinuclear” (p. 116) and that he is only criticizing what he sees as a nuclear double standard.  For me, it does no good to point out problems if you aren’t also willing to at least grapple with the issues involved in advocating a course of action, especially when dealing with an issue as charged as nuclear weapons. Your solution may not be ideal and there may be flaws, but at least offering or attempting to offer a counter provides a way to have a discussion. Gusterson seems to see no reason to do so. He wants to be a part of the conversation but only on his terms.
            My second complaint is that his analysis in certain areas lacks the rigor required to validate the point he is making. He frequently refers to American (and to a lesser extent, British) press statements from legislators, members of the executive branch, and security intelligentsia regarding why Third World countries should not be nuclear armed. I agree that the language is condescending and some of the ideas advanced spurious. But he fails to explore how these “rogue” nuclear states themselves discuss either their efforts to acquire nuclear weapons or their justification for their continued possession while not signing global treaties. By not looking at the Third World countries themselves and their use of rhetoric, it gives the appearance that he is only looking at one side of the issue, possibly because to analyze the other would invalidate his ideas.

            This leads to my third complaint, incomplete or inaccurate information. Relating to press reporting, Gusterson rails against Western bias against Indian and Pakistani weapon names, claiming that Westerners were either exaggerating or wrong about the nature of the system names. Specifically mentioned is the Indian Agni system, which Gusterson claims is only the Hindi word for “fire” and not a god of the same name. (p. 126) This is technically true, but either ignores or failed to discover that Agni is also the Sanskrit word for fire and the Vedic god of fire. It’s unlikely the Indians naming their missile didn’t know this, and even simply calling a nuclear weapon “fire” is implying the weapon’s destructive power and nature. Gusterson is seemingly omitting this information and I can only speculate as to why. But for me it calls into question his motives.

            What we have are two academics approaching the same issue of nuclear non-proliferation but doing do in widely divergent methods and for me, levels of effectiveness. One offers a non-biased, rational way forward while the other seems to me more interesting in railing against the system.