The starting point of the last dialogue dealt with how Institutional arrangements are made surrounding actors being able to transact with each other to achieve broader authority apparel under sustained arrangements. The public sphere derives from the audiences' request for legitimation claims, whereby members of the body deliberate and decide to either accept or reject a course of action. Professor Jackson noted that the idea is not necessarily based on interest, yet as we translate the significance of public consensus public exchanges of values increases on an the international level.
According to the World Bank, others recall the Global public sphere as a metaphor for any space that exists in cultural contexts: the village, the town hall, in ancient times the agora --a place where people come together to voice common concerns, a process that leads to the crystallization of public opinion (Odugembi, 2011). What are the ramifications when physical boundaries of a gathering place are removed, as with the age of social media and instant cross cultural communication? Boundaries become soft-shelled and have the functionality of legitimation claims to dwell in attuned or autonomous modalities. As such, the values and attitudes propagated by those who once ascribed to the "literal gathering place" (def. the agora) float in a new territory: cyberspace.
I am curious to know, since cyberspace is a platform for (1). cultivation (2). Ideological exchanges (3)cross cultural engagement does that necessarily engender conflict with regards to pro-regulation and anti-regulation opinions. It seems as though the United States bares more concern over the threat of National cyber security, critical infrastructure, and the protection of ideas. But, is it necessary to impose hard boundaries on cyber public consensus when private industries voice against it? The presence of debates in cyberspace also evokes a sense protectionism. To what extent do participating members, that aspire to reduce harm (ie. engage military conflicts) facilitate on behalf of the public sector and private industry when there are such things online attacks?
http://blogs.worldbank.org/team/sina-odugbemi
Monday, March 31, 2014
The Agora: Is There a Global Public Sphere?
Sunday, March 30, 2014
The Global Public Sphere and Authority?
This week’s soliloquy dealt with the question “Is there a
global public sphere”, defined as the audience from legitimation claims to be
acting on the public’s authority via its institutions. Professor Jackson asked
the question, in terms of the domestic realm, “Do we condone “X” being done on
our behalf” and can that same public consensus exist at the international
level.
On reflection, I have come to initially think that there is
not one public sphere, but rather multiple public spheres, existing within nations and international organizations, overlapping and intersecting. Take,
for instance, NATO. NATO operates on behalf of its constituent states, via
consensus as established in its treaty. In the late 1990s, NATO’s members believed there needed to be an
international response to the on-going conflict and possible genocide taking
place in Kosovo, between ethnic Albanians and the Serbian government. It seemed
likely that when presented to the United Nations Security Council, Russia, and
possibly China, would veto any UN-sponsored effort to intervene. Rather than be
deterred, NATO utilized its own public authority to begin military operations
to end Serbian military operations in Kosovo. Only after NATO began operations
did the UN provide approval for NATO’s request to intervene. In this example,
we see two similar global public spheres, operating on their own authorities
and with the consent of their publics.
To date, I’m not sure if there have been any military
conflicts openly declared between two internationally recognized international
organizations, but I’m curious as to how the United Nations would respond were
that to happen. What would it do if say, NATO and the AU were to each
independently request authorization to commence military operations against
each other? Presumably the US, UK and France would veto the AU while possibly
Russia and/or China would veto NATO. Would that render the whole issue moot and
force the two sides to negotiate? Or would they simply ignore the UN and go at
it? If there is no way to enforce public authority, does it really exist? In the case of Kosovo, NATO acted as an autonomous entity, with hard borders, despite being an international organization. Each member state's government had to authorize NATO to move forward, but in the public sphere, it was a single entity, NATO, that conducted the operation. Where does the line come down?
Saturday, March 29, 2014
The Landless Tenant: Economic Autonomy and Public Authority
After this past week’s class, where we discussed economic
autonomy and global business, I wanted to delve a little further into the role
that international organizations play in providing global businesses economic
autonomy and in some cases, authority. I know I’ve looked at this before, but I
think I’m going in another direction, so bear with me.
Specifically, I’m thinking of the IMF and its use of
conditionality regarding the loan packages it offers. I think most readers will
know what it is, but if not, here’s a brief run-down. Conditionality in IMF
loans are the demands the IMF makes upon the recipient in order to receive, and
continue to receive, IMF funds. Typically, these conditions include market
liberalization, lowering or removing tariffs and quotas, and the sale or
privatization of state-owned industries. In principle, these ideas make sense
because if these systems were working, the country in question would have no
need for these loans. The international community is assisting a fellow country
adapt to better succeed in the international realm and presumably provide a
better quality of life to its citizens by improved economic and financial
processes.
But who is able to immediately take advantage of these new
opportunities? In almost all cases, it is large, international investment firms
and multinational corporations. While their money may provide some lift, most
of the profits are likely not remaining in the new market, being spent at local
grocery stores or other retail outlets, being used to invest in new businesses
tailored to the host country, or any of the host of ways that successful local
businesses support their communities, because the investors do not reside in the country where
this money is being made. By and large, it is enabling foreigners to profit
from the work of the locals while not providing the full benefit a locally established business might. It also enabling these foreign entities to lobby
and apply pressure to the host government to continue to provide favorable
conditions to these foreign investors, possibly to the detriment of building a
sustainable group of local businesses. Their vast wealth, facilitated and
enabled in part by the international organization community, provides them with
an economic autonomy that the loan recipient itself does not possess.
As we looked at in an earlier reading (Abrahamsen and
Williams), these corporations are also, in certain cases, able to acquire and provide their own security,
more or less independent from the host state, and in many cases they provide
better security to their area of interest and pay a better wage. With the
ability to provide economic and physical security, are these entities now
landless sovereigns, able to utilize their economic autonomy to move from place
to place as needed? What happens when, inevitably, this tenant sovereign no
longer finds the landholding is needed or able to provide sufficient economic
value and simply moves on?
To me, at least in this scenario, the international community
is enabling the destruction of the very thing that it claims to stand for: the
importance and inviolability of the sovereign state.
Tuesday, March 25, 2014
Week 11 Response to the Downside of Celebrity Diplomacy
Arguably denoted, celebrities and politics ought to work to achieve socialization towards development issues on the same public platform. Whether humanity approves of the crossover relations or not, celebrity involvement in international affairs and global politics is bound to happen. Deiter and Kumar don't focus on this particular argument in the issue of hollywood endorsements, rather they delineate three components of the long term impact that international organizations might have if both political leaders and celebrities maximize a public platform that is not often attained by us 'regular' people. For Kumar and Dieter, politician and celebrity joint efforts can loose traction and even fall short based on the following oversimplifications of global issues: (1)Moral obligations and well intentioned campaigned are propagated, yet nuance is inevitably lost (2) Celebrities lack mandate and legal competence in global diplomacy (3) Participation of an 'ill-equipped' celebrity figure within a political discourse can raise questions to a global organization's legitimacy.
It's understandable that popular figures do not epistemically relate to experiences that deal with: poverty reduction, foreign aid, institutional and economic inequality. But, I gather that "beyond hollywood" diplomacy can inhibit the long term causes of a regional organization by the same token that an ill fitting celebrity figure can do so without proper guidance and recognition of roles. Here, A critical assessment of hollywood influences on the field of development and IR exists in what actors, musicians, and models do best: role play. Celebrities ought to act as the "door opener" and diplomatic figures can benefit from the "diplomatic profile" of a celebrity figure especially in a fast-paced environment that the world continues to . The average citizen connects to relatable figures that are essentially contributing to a cause that is larger than their own self importance. Dieter and Kuman also note that, in most cases, celebrities are self-appointed and their credibility rests on charisma and the 'power play' value of their backpackers.
Yet, where do celebrity figures such as Alek Wek exists in Dieter and Kumar's conceptualization of good global governance -ones that have legitimacy on both sides: personal exposure to the issues and celebrity standing?
Alek Wek, a Sudanese High fashion model arrived to Europe as a refugee -long before the had any relatable connection to a public platform. At the time she was unable to return to her war torn homeland nor was she able rekindle the relationships that she had once established as a resident of Sudan. Because of her lived experience in both realms she desired to raise awareness for others who have suffered a similar circumstances via UNHCR as a National Goodwill Ambassador. Clearly, her anomalous presence and public platform in to both discourses sheds light on the value of broad political interests, good global governance, and celebrity evolvement.
http://www.playagainstallodds.ca/factualweb/us/2.3/articles/alek_wek.html
http://www.bellanaija.com/2013/06/19/international-model-alek-wek-joins-angelina-jolie-sophie-lauren-as-the-newest-un-refugee-agencys-unhcr-national-goodwill-ambassador/
Does the author regard her to be on the same tier as Bono, Angelina Jolie, Brad Pitt, or Ronald Reagan?
It's understandable that popular figures do not epistemically relate to experiences that deal with: poverty reduction, foreign aid, institutional and economic inequality. But, I gather that "beyond hollywood" diplomacy can inhibit the long term causes of a regional organization by the same token that an ill fitting celebrity figure can do so without proper guidance and recognition of roles. Here, A critical assessment of hollywood influences on the field of development and IR exists in what actors, musicians, and models do best: role play. Celebrities ought to act as the "door opener" and diplomatic figures can benefit from the "diplomatic profile" of a celebrity figure especially in a fast-paced environment that the world continues to . The average citizen connects to relatable figures that are essentially contributing to a cause that is larger than their own self importance. Dieter and Kuman also note that, in most cases, celebrities are self-appointed and their credibility rests on charisma and the 'power play' value of their backpackers.
Yet, where do celebrity figures such as Alek Wek exists in Dieter and Kumar's conceptualization of good global governance -ones that have legitimacy on both sides: personal exposure to the issues and celebrity standing?
Alek Wek, a Sudanese High fashion model arrived to Europe as a refugee -long before the had any relatable connection to a public platform. At the time she was unable to return to her war torn homeland nor was she able rekindle the relationships that she had once established as a resident of Sudan. Because of her lived experience in both realms she desired to raise awareness for others who have suffered a similar circumstances via UNHCR as a National Goodwill Ambassador. Clearly, her anomalous presence and public platform in to both discourses sheds light on the value of broad political interests, good global governance, and celebrity evolvement.
http://www.playagainstallodds.ca/factualweb/us/2.3/articles/alek_wek.html
http://www.bellanaija.com/2013/06/19/international-model-alek-wek-joins-angelina-jolie-sophie-lauren-as-the-newest-un-refugee-agencys-unhcr-national-goodwill-ambassador/
Does the author regard her to be on the same tier as Bono, Angelina Jolie, Brad Pitt, or Ronald Reagan?
Monday, March 24, 2014
Domestic to International
I really enjoyed this weeks soliloquy and wanted to submit a pre-blog just to help me work through some of the ideas before class by applying some domestic history as a historical microcosm of the international.
I immediately thought of the writing of the US Constitution and its authors/deliberators. Looking just at the "Founding Fathers" it seems like there was a brief moment in time where it was possible for individuals to put aside their own interests and create an institution that defined the collective and provided guidance for future decisions. I think that this is true even with the problem of most of the public authorities being slave holders and wealthy. Yet, it didn't take long for there to be disagreements on the legitimacy of the expression of public authority. Two examples about 170 years apart.
First, after the failure of the Articles of Confederation a strong Fed. government is created but only after outlining some guaranteed rights for citizens and states. But almost immediately there was a crisis as the federal government passed a law that two states sought to nullify. As Kentucky and Virginia attempted to assert their own sovereignty they submitted a petition to the other states promoting the idea that states could ignore certain federal laws. In the Constitutional Period each state had realized the weakness and vulnerability of the Confederation and decided to give up some sovereignty and then created a document expressing the General Will. However, with the passage of the Alien and Sedition Acts, Kentucky and Virginia experienced some "buyers remorse". Their appeal to the other states (public sphere) was rejected because the remaining states were still committed to the principals of a federal government.
For the international realm this should mean that at certain moments of crisis, Nation-States can agree to certain "Constitutions" or at least "Conventions", that set out identity and imply action.
The second example from the domestic to the international is the idea that once a State make a proclamation, that activists will attempt to hold the Public Authority to that position.
In the first minute of this clip Dr. King reminds his audience of the promises of America and of the difference between America and other nations' values.
As difficult as this struggle would be for Civil Rights in the US, it is even more difficult in the international realm to get states to "put something on paper" and then have them shamed into being "true to it".
I immediately thought of the writing of the US Constitution and its authors/deliberators. Looking just at the "Founding Fathers" it seems like there was a brief moment in time where it was possible for individuals to put aside their own interests and create an institution that defined the collective and provided guidance for future decisions. I think that this is true even with the problem of most of the public authorities being slave holders and wealthy. Yet, it didn't take long for there to be disagreements on the legitimacy of the expression of public authority. Two examples about 170 years apart.
First, after the failure of the Articles of Confederation a strong Fed. government is created but only after outlining some guaranteed rights for citizens and states. But almost immediately there was a crisis as the federal government passed a law that two states sought to nullify. As Kentucky and Virginia attempted to assert their own sovereignty they submitted a petition to the other states promoting the idea that states could ignore certain federal laws. In the Constitutional Period each state had realized the weakness and vulnerability of the Confederation and decided to give up some sovereignty and then created a document expressing the General Will. However, with the passage of the Alien and Sedition Acts, Kentucky and Virginia experienced some "buyers remorse". Their appeal to the other states (public sphere) was rejected because the remaining states were still committed to the principals of a federal government.
For the international realm this should mean that at certain moments of crisis, Nation-States can agree to certain "Constitutions" or at least "Conventions", that set out identity and imply action.
The second example from the domestic to the international is the idea that once a State make a proclamation, that activists will attempt to hold the Public Authority to that position.
As difficult as this struggle would be for Civil Rights in the US, it is even more difficult in the international realm to get states to "put something on paper" and then have them shamed into being "true to it".
Internationalization and Domestic Politics Sylvia Maxfield and Stephan Haggard
In Haggard and Maxfield's discussion of institutional financial arrangements I found it easy to relate to the idea of clashing logics for a better understanding of what underlies exchange. It raises questions as to who determines the language of financial transaction and to who validates the success of international exchange? The formation of the GATT, WTO, and World bank have sought to reduce trade barriers in the developing world, yet it strikes me as to believe that its creation was supported mostly by competitive logic and broad social values. Part of the difficulty in Haggards' assessment of the GATT and WTO is how the neo-liberal agenda is defined--a term that is tossed around quite often. Are competitive markets the leading determinant of what it means to be accountable for economic aims and to what extent is trade liberalization a social value? The typologies based on autonomy, the left side of the quadrant, seem to account for the biggest explanations of capital flow in the course of history. So, is it possible that pure competitive markets and social enterprises have dominated the way economic institutions deal with exchange?
More importantly, this question brought me to their shared position that: "Increasing international economic integration not only changes the distribution of preferences; but it also erodes the effectiveness of governments maintaining controls." This statement in an of itself is one of the complexities of the movement to liberalize and open financial systems to foreign competition. The presupposition of competition also explains how much of the language centers around liberalization, interdependence, and crises. The basic presumption, as the asynchronous material suggests, is that corporate entities act for economy exchange as basic modality whereby a private transaction of goods is done through trade. For me, I continue to see that interdependence of financial markets and responses to crisis centers around the premise of competition in the first place, when we discuss global economic bodies.
More importantly, this question brought me to their shared position that: "Increasing international economic integration not only changes the distribution of preferences; but it also erodes the effectiveness of governments maintaining controls." This statement in an of itself is one of the complexities of the movement to liberalize and open financial systems to foreign competition. The presupposition of competition also explains how much of the language centers around liberalization, interdependence, and crises. The basic presumption, as the asynchronous material suggests, is that corporate entities act for economy exchange as basic modality whereby a private transaction of goods is done through trade. For me, I continue to see that interdependence of financial markets and responses to crisis centers around the premise of competition in the first place, when we discuss global economic bodies.
Tuesday, March 18, 2014
Week 10: Class Pre-Blog "Economic and Non State Actors".
I understand that globalization has placed new challenges to the economic
world particularly as it relates to Private Authority and Governance. By and large, many of the hurdles to deal with on a constant basis would be contextual ambiguity. In essence what
are the driving factors that enable the international collective body to
properly ascertain what is required from the economic enterprise as a whole? It begs the question: who regulates what and
for that matter are the frameworks in place to scope rules, regulations, laws? In our reading it became
evident that physical cross-national borders do not properly fit within the
construct of globalization let alone enables for business practices to leverage
technology advancements. As a result, there leaves room for a shift in business mindset is imperative to
facilitate governance and authority…meaning “gentlemen rules” must apply
whereby private sectors can work in direct collaboration with not only its
national infrastructure but also with international partners for the better
good. However, this collaboration has to
transcend and more so be “managed with discrete oversight” by a third party
entity such as WTO; otherwise accountability will deteriorate.
It seems at though a private authority figures are cemented in internal relationships collaboration (See. Inayatullah 62.), on
the contrary it should reinforce jurisdiction since collectively those processes
benefits information exchange. In making this distinction, authors have suggested that economic capacity and
capability could be enhanced thus reducing conflict. More importantly authority should be
underpinned by strategic alliances.
Alliance should lead to agreements with oversights by nation states with
common interest. For instance the US
over the years has had political friction with many States but ultimately and
in recent year’s collective agreements with Russia has surfaced to leverage
space technology since the larger scope has become too expensive to handle
individually. Likewise, with China’s
economic growth synergy between nations must occur as long as
intellectual/corporate property is honored and followed. Bottom line, Private
and Public actors cannot and should not be segregated in our global and
interconnected world, but rather they should be holistic in nature with
oversight (governance) all leading to economic synergy.
From this reading, I would like to continue making the distinction between the dynamics between legal barriers and economic mechanisms that allow Non-State Actors to behave the way that do.
Monday, March 10, 2014
The rules have changed but the game is still rigged
Between the
readings and the soliloquy this week, there were numerous topics of interest
that drifted across the brain. The reading I found most interesting was that of
Naeem Inayatullah and his essay on the dilemma of sovereignty and political
economy. While reading it, I began to recognize the significant disparity in
the global economic system and the disadvantage post-colonial states have in
developing an economy designed to bring wealth to its citizenry, rather than
provide wealth to a former colonial power or, as is frequently the case now,
the ruling elites of that country.
As was pointed out via the historical examples Mr. Inayatullah provided, (Egypt, Haiti, India) all colonial economies were designed to provide raw materials and captive markets for finished good to their imperial owners. There was never any intention of developing those territories’ economies to provide for their own well-being but rather the colonial powers utilized what Dr. Jackson referred to as “underdevelopment through functional specialization” and the global economic system still reflects that. In fact, the post World War II economic institutions continue to perpetuate this system via different means. I’m specifically thinking of the IMF and the use of conditionality in their loan terms. An almost de riguer policy requirement is for the loan recipient to liberalize their economy and open it to foreign investment, trade, and companies. In all the ways that matter, this is no different than the United Kingdom using Egypt for cotton or India for tea and spices or any of its other colonial possessions for raw materials. Only now, the raw material being exploited is the labor rich pool provided by a loan recipient and the significantly lower wages required to obtain their labor or financial institutions desperate for foreign capital.
As was pointed out via the historical examples Mr. Inayatullah provided, (Egypt, Haiti, India) all colonial economies were designed to provide raw materials and captive markets for finished good to their imperial owners. There was never any intention of developing those territories’ economies to provide for their own well-being but rather the colonial powers utilized what Dr. Jackson referred to as “underdevelopment through functional specialization” and the global economic system still reflects that. In fact, the post World War II economic institutions continue to perpetuate this system via different means. I’m specifically thinking of the IMF and the use of conditionality in their loan terms. An almost de riguer policy requirement is for the loan recipient to liberalize their economy and open it to foreign investment, trade, and companies. In all the ways that matter, this is no different than the United Kingdom using Egypt for cotton or India for tea and spices or any of its other colonial possessions for raw materials. Only now, the raw material being exploited is the labor rich pool provided by a loan recipient and the significantly lower wages required to obtain their labor or financial institutions desperate for foreign capital.
Relatedly, I found it interesting
that in the Haggard and Maxfield article, the authors discuss
balance-of-payment crises and the role those incidents played in various
countries’ attempt to liberalize their economies, but never once mentioned any
role the IMF did or did not play in those countries attempts to adopt those
policies in response to their crises. To me, it seemed intentionally obtuse, as
though they had a specific reason to not
mention the IMF.
Following back
into the topic of colonialism, a part of Dr. Jackson’s soliloquy made me think
of an under-mentioned aspect of American history, when he spoke of corporations
and their use of violence and then later alluded to the incident of the
American Banana Wars in Central America and the Caribbean during the first
three decades of the 20th century. America with impressive
regularity would deploy military forces, typically in the form of US Marines,
in order to protect the interests and power of American companies. In this
particular case, it wasn’t the fruit company itself (or oil company or sugar
company or financial institution) utilizing force directly but strongly
influencing the government of its home country to intercede on its behalf. It is certainly an interesting intersection of public authority defending private interests at the expense of another, weaker state's sovereignty.
Sunday, March 9, 2014
Pre-Class Week 10 Social Covenant
The issue of PSCs came up toward the end of our session this week and there seemed to be a fair amount of interest in the topic in the chat window. Professor Tamara asked about the relationship between the social contract and privatization. There are a lot of things to consider about Nationalism, Sovereignty, and IR, in dealing with the rise of PSCs and it got me thinking about the gated communities I see around Portland. Can local politics be applied to IR?
What does the proliferation of these gated communities (GC) say about the State? Portland consistently ranks as one of the most livable cities so why would anyone choose to live in a gated community?
These artificial communities must provide something that the State can or will not provide? Certainly many of these GC provide residents with a sense of security. Guarded gates and golf cart patrols are part of the package. Recreational facilities are provided with obligatory golf courses as well as pools, health clubs, and meeting rooms. How do these private recreational facilities change the relationship between the tax payer and the State? If security services are provided at the very local level, is it necessary to support city or state police? It seems that cities or local governments that allow for this type of privatization are encouraging the fraying of the social contract. Living inside a GC allows you to redefine citizenship.
What about in US foreign policy? I think some people in our class might have direct experience with the implications of life in the Green Zone in Baghdad. If it is half as true as described by Rajiv Chandrasekaran in Imperial Life in the Emerald City, then it is no wonder that US policy did not lead to Iraqi stability. I am interested to know if anyone in the class has direct experience in the Zone.(http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/17/books/review/Goldfarb.t.html?_r=0)
To revisit the question from class, I think that the social contract includes not only the recognition of giving up some freedom for security, but a more liberal notion that we also commit ourselves to a bit of altruism. (Or at least enlightened self-interest) It is the "Social" part that gets lost when the focus is on privatization and "contract". Does it make a difference if we think of it as a "social covenant"?
What does the proliferation of these gated communities (GC) say about the State? Portland consistently ranks as one of the most livable cities so why would anyone choose to live in a gated community?
These artificial communities must provide something that the State can or will not provide? Certainly many of these GC provide residents with a sense of security. Guarded gates and golf cart patrols are part of the package. Recreational facilities are provided with obligatory golf courses as well as pools, health clubs, and meeting rooms. How do these private recreational facilities change the relationship between the tax payer and the State? If security services are provided at the very local level, is it necessary to support city or state police? It seems that cities or local governments that allow for this type of privatization are encouraging the fraying of the social contract. Living inside a GC allows you to redefine citizenship.
What about in US foreign policy? I think some people in our class might have direct experience with the implications of life in the Green Zone in Baghdad. If it is half as true as described by Rajiv Chandrasekaran in Imperial Life in the Emerald City, then it is no wonder that US policy did not lead to Iraqi stability. I am interested to know if anyone in the class has direct experience in the Zone.(http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/17/books/review/Goldfarb.t.html?_r=0)
To revisit the question from class, I think that the social contract includes not only the recognition of giving up some freedom for security, but a more liberal notion that we also commit ourselves to a bit of altruism. (Or at least enlightened self-interest) It is the "Social" part that gets lost when the focus is on privatization and "contract". Does it make a difference if we think of it as a "social covenant"?
Wednesday, March 5, 2014
Dr. Strangelove is hiding under his desk
I realized
last night after class that when discussing nuclear non-proliferation and
reduction, I sounded much more idealistic than I really am. While I do believe
that the treaties are valuable and necessary, due to the incredible destructive
power of the weapons and the razor-thin (some would say non-existent) margin
for error that exists for accidental deployment (not to even get in to the
issues of mishandling and non-state acquisition), I’m not all puppies and
rainbows when it comes to the treaties.
There is
very much a calculated risk involved in the negotiation and implementation of treaties.
There are written into the treaties a very robust inspection mechanism because
as the realists point out, the possibility of cheating creates a huge risk and
disincentive to comply. It is, I feel, this risk of cheating that is the largest impediment to
nuclear weapons elimination. As it stands right now, the two largest
nuclear-armed powers have enough warheads (mounted on inter-continental
ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, or submarine-launched ballistic missiles, as well as bombs)
to destroy each other (and everyone else) many times over. And be able to do so if any one (or two)
of the other methods is rendered incapable.
According to the Federation of American Scientists, Russia and the
United States have between them over 16,000 total nuclear weapons. That seems
pretty excessive when the next highest total is France with 300. (https://www.fas.org/programs/ssp/nukes/nuclearweapons/nukestatus.html;
current as of 2013, accessed March 5,
2014)
With that much destructive power, and presumably little incentive to use it, I agree with Bruce Blair that there should be a strong incentive to lengthen the amount of time required to equip, arm, and launch an attack with these weapons. As Austin pointed out, to get the list presented by Blair completed is completely unrealistic. But accomplishing any one of those items (such as permanently separating warheads from delivery mechanisms) would significantly increase the time available when attempting to determine a possible nuclear launch while still preserving a capacity to respond. I don’t know that the weapons will ever be ever completely eliminated (tiger-by-the-tail sort of situation that it is) but negotiating towards a situation whereby better decision-making due to an increase in the time available would seem to me to be worthwhile endeavor.
With that much destructive power, and presumably little incentive to use it, I agree with Bruce Blair that there should be a strong incentive to lengthen the amount of time required to equip, arm, and launch an attack with these weapons. As Austin pointed out, to get the list presented by Blair completed is completely unrealistic. But accomplishing any one of those items (such as permanently separating warheads from delivery mechanisms) would significantly increase the time available when attempting to determine a possible nuclear launch while still preserving a capacity to respond. I don’t know that the weapons will ever be ever completely eliminated (tiger-by-the-tail sort of situation that it is) but negotiating towards a situation whereby better decision-making due to an increase in the time available would seem to me to be worthwhile endeavor.
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