Dr. Strangelove is hiding under his desk

            I realized last night after class that when discussing nuclear non-proliferation and reduction, I sounded much more idealistic than I really am. While I do believe that the treaties are valuable and necessary, due to the incredible destructive power of the weapons and the razor-thin (some would say non-existent) margin for error that exists for accidental deployment (not to even get in to the issues of mishandling and non-state acquisition), I’m not all puppies and rainbows when it comes to the treaties.

            There is very much a calculated risk involved in the negotiation and implementation of treaties. There are written into the treaties a very robust inspection mechanism because as the realists point out, the possibility of cheating creates a huge risk and disincentive to comply. It is, I feel, this risk of cheating that is the largest impediment to nuclear weapons elimination. As it stands right now, the two largest nuclear-armed powers have enough warheads (mounted on inter-continental ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, or submarine-launched ballistic missiles, as well as bombs) to destroy each other (and everyone else) many times over. And be able to do so if any one (or two) of the other methods is rendered incapable.  According to the Federation of American Scientists, Russia and the United States have between them over 16,000 total nuclear weapons. That seems pretty excessive when the next highest total is France with 300. (https://www.fas.org/programs/ssp/nukes/nuclearweapons/nukestatus.html;  current as of 2013, accessed March 5, 2014)

            With that much destructive power, and presumably little incentive to use it, I agree with Bruce Blair that there should be a strong incentive to lengthen the amount of time required to equip, arm, and launch an attack with these weapons. As Austin pointed out, to get the list presented by Blair completed is completely unrealistic. But accomplishing any one of those items (such as permanently separating warheads from delivery mechanisms) would significantly increase the time available when attempting to determine a possible nuclear launch while still preserving a capacity to respond. I don’t know that the weapons will ever be ever completely eliminated (tiger-by-the-tail sort of situation that it is) but negotiating towards a situation whereby better decision-making due to an increase in the time available would seem to me to be worthwhile endeavor.